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EU enlargement offers significant welfare gains to old and new member states. However, these welfare gains do not 
come automatically but have to be earned by appropriate adjustments in domestic policies. This is particularly relevant 
for Germany’s New Laender, which could benefit from the proximity to the new EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe but which also suffer particularly from inefficient institutions in Germany. Welfare gains will only be 
realised if wage adjustment is flexible. Instead, the German welfare system implicitly creates downward rigid wages. 
Without appropriate social policy reforms, the competitive pressure and the mobility of capital will destroy jobs in the 
New Laender. The paper shows the potential benefits and risks of economic integration in a simple partial equilibrium 
setting with flexible and rigid labour markets, respectively. We also discuss the entrepreneurial willingness and ability 
in the New Laender to adjust to the changing competitive conditions after EU enlargement. 
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1 Introduction 
At first sight, the debate on EU enlargement in Germany is confusing. On the one 
hand, experts – academics, politicians and journalists – stress that Germany will be 
the main beneficiary from EU enlargement. In particular, the New Laender seem to 
be the perfect candidates for gains from market integration: regional proximity, a long 
tradition of trade relations and large differences in factor prices. On the other hand, 
there are a lot of warning signs even from strictly market oriented economists that EU 
enlargement may cause a loss of jobs in Germany. Investment and jobs in the New 
Laender may move further East, leaving a Mezzogiorno region in Germany for a long 
time. 
This contribution will shed light on these seemingly contradictory views. We argue 
that Germany’s ability to gain from EU enlargement will mostly depend on labour 
market flexibility. Standard economic theory of international trade assumes flexible 
price and wage adjustments. With flexible wages, a country can gain from trade and 
economic integration. Countries use their comparative advantages to their mutual 
benefits. The outcome is quite different, however, when labour markets cannot adjust 
to the new environment. From the German point of view, EU enlargement implies that 
labour-intensive economies join the common market. This creates pressure on Ger-
man (low-skilled) wages. If the institutional settings, such as wage bargaining and 
welfare payments, prevent the necessary adjustments in the market, the gains from 
trade are replaced by job destruction.  
Not to be mistaken: We do not question EU enlargement per se. We merely wish to 
point out that the gains from integration can only be realised with flexible markets. 
And concerning labour markets, Germany’s New Laender have still a stony road 
ahead. 
In Section 2, we briefly review some of the major economic trends in the New 
Laender over the past decade. The insufficient labour market flexibility is already a 
major obstacle to sustainable development in the New Laender, which will even be 
aggravated in the surge of EU enlargement. Section 3 shows the potential benefits 
and risks of economic integration in a simple partial equilibrium setting with flexible 
and rigid labour markets, respectively. In Section 4, we discuss the entrepreneurial 
willingness and ability in the New Laender to adjust to the changing competitive con-  3
ditions after EU enlargement. Section 5 shows that demographic change creates an 
additional challenge for the New Laender as it weakens their comparative advantage 
in skill-intensive production. Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
2 Fundamental Economic Trends in Germany’s New Laender 
In many areas, German unification has eliminated the huge differences between East 
and West Germany. For instance, the quality of housing, shopping opportunities, the 
media landscape, preservation of historic districts are similar in both East and West. 
Compared to other transition countries, East Germany pursued a steep convergence 
path – thanks to the massive transfers from West to East. There is, however, one 
important area where convergence lags far behind: the economy.  
Some optimistic observers often stress the steady productivity growth in East Ger-
many (Figure 1). Indeed, labour productivity per employee in East Germany has in-
creased from € 15,410 in 1991 to € 42,086 in 2003. In the last few years, productivity 
growth has somewhat slowed down but is still positive. 
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Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder” (2004), own calcu-
lations. 
Unfortunately, the productivity figure is completely misleading. Labour productivity 
can increase either because each worker becomes more productive or because less 
productive jobs are eliminated. In Germany, the second alternative has applied. Fig-
ure 2 shows GDP per active population rather than per employee. Until the mid-
1990s, East German GDP was converging towards West German levels. Since 1996,   4
however, the convergence process has come to a halt. The constant and partly in-
creasing gap to West German GDP can clearly not be attributed to high German 
growth rates. West Germany also experienced only moderate growth in these years. 
Figure 2: GDP per Active Population in the New Laender 
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       Source: Ifo Institute, own calculations. 
The main reason for East Germany’s sluggish economy is the steady loss of jobs. 
Fewer and fewer workers contribute to East Germany’s GDP. Figure 3 shows em-
ployment in the Old Laender and in the New Laender. Employment in the Old 
Laender has moved with the business cycle but, on average, has been fairly stable. 
In contrast, the New Laender have seen a steady decline in employment. Between 
January 1994 and January 2004, employment dropped by about 20 %.   5
Figure 3: Employment in the Old and New Laender 
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Source: Federal Employment Agency, data available upon request. 
The dramatic decline in employment can be traced back to the early 1990s. In the 
process of German unification, many West German institutions were introduced in 
the New Laender, which were already suffering from the Socialist heritage of techni-
cal inefficiencies. Wages were increased to near Western levels and Western stan-
dards on safety, pension entitlements, unemployment protection, co-determination 
rights or tenure laws were introduced. Hence, East German jobs were almost imme-
diately subject to nearly the same wage costs as jobs in West Germany. East Ger-
man labour costs rose from 7% of the West German level in 1989 to 64% in 2001. As 
a consequence, many jobs were lost and unemployment increased rapidly.   6
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        Source: Reinberg und Hummel (2003). 
Today, the welfare system (social assistance and unemployment benefits) prevents 
wages from downward adjustments, and collective wage bargaining leads to wage 
compression. These two factors have created massive unemployment predominantly 
among low-skilled workers, as Figure 4 shows. Unemployment rates for the high-
skilled are low and more or less the same in East and West Germany. For the low-
skilled, however, the East-West gap is significant. The unemployment rate among 
workers without vocational training reaches 50 percent in the New Laender. With 
such massive unemployment, wages for the low-skilled should adjust downwards to 
bring the labour market back to equilibrium. Without policy reforms, however, wages 
for the low-skilled workers cannot fall below the current level. Welfare and unem-
ployment benefits create an implicit minimum wage. The labour supply for job offers 
with lower wages is non-existent. 
3.  Flexible and Rigid Wages 
The new EU members possess a major advantage in having relatively low labour 
costs. While labour costs per hour in the West German manufacturing sector 
amounted to over € 31 in 2002, they were below € 10 in all the new member states 
and even down to € 1.23 in Bulgaria (see Figure 5). East German labour costs are 
below West German levels but still far above the new EU member states. 
Old Laender 
New Laender  7




























  Source: Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (2004). 
Such large factor price differentials also offer gains from trade and profitable invest-
ments for ‘old Europe’. Foreign direct investment in the Central and East European 
EU accession countries has reached considerable levels. The inward FDI flows into 
these eight countries amounted to $ 2.3 bn in 2002; the inward FDI stocks more than 
quadrupled from $ 31.3 bn in 1995 to $ 134.2 bn in 2002 (UNCTAD 2003). The litera-
ture on FDI stresses proximity to markets and factor price differentials as the two 
main motives for carrying out FDI (Brecher and Feenstra 1983, Brenton, Di Mauro 
and Lücke 1999 and Caves 1982). These two motives also dominate the FDI of 
German firms in the Central and East European EU accession countries. In an Ifo 
survey of more than 1,000 German firms, 70% of the firms mentioned low labour 
costs as a prominent reason for investment in these countries (see Figure 6).
1 The 
benefit of lower wages even dominates the closer distance to the markets, which in-
fluenced investment decisions in 47% of the firms. Furthermore, one third of the firms 
mentioned the low tax rates, compared with Germany, as an important motive for 
investment. According to a recently conducted analysis, the average effective tax 
burden for firms reaches 21.3% in the accession countries, whereas it amounts to 
                                                 
1  Ifo survey exclusively conducted for Wirtschaftswoche, see Handschuch (2004).   8
36% in Germany (Ernst&Young 2003 and Handschuch 2004). Finally, 28% of the 
firms reckoned that lower regulatory burdens make Eastern Europe attractive for FDI. 











          Source: Handschuch (2004). 
In German public opinion, these investments – often associated with relocation of 
production activities – are frequently seen as a threat to the economic viability of 
West European regions.
2 With competitive goods and factor markets, however, these 
fears are unfounded. The relocation of activities is not only beneficial for individual 
firms but also generates welfare gains for the country as a whole. With flexible labour 
markets, the capital-exporting country also gains from investment abroad.
3 The po-
tential welfare gain for the capital-exporting country can be shown in a simple partial 
equilibrium framework.  
                                                 
2 A similar debate was recently triggered in the US by Gregory Mankiw, President Bush’s chief eco-
nomic adviser, when arguing that the outsourcing of jobs has probably net beneficial effects on the 
economy in the long run; see Davis, Schroeder and Aeppel (2004). 
3 We neglect distributional issues here. The necessary adjustment makes capital owners and high-
skilled workers better off at the expense of (low-skilled) workers.   9
Figure 7: Welfare Gains from FDI 
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Figure 7 shows the marginal productivity of capital in Germany (D) and Poland (PL). 
The distance 0D0PL on the horizontal axis measures the total available capital in both 
countries. The amount of capital in Germany is measured from left to right, the 
amount of capital in Poland from right to left. The initial distribution of capital is given 
by K  (0DK  in Germany and K 0PL in Poland). Before FDI takes place, the marginal 
product of capital in Poland (A) exceeds the marginal product in Germany (B) reflect-
ing the profitable investment opportunities.  
The high marginal product gives entrepreneurs an incentive to relocate capital to Po-
land. In the long-run equilibrium, the marginal products of capital are equalised (C). 
The foreign direct investment in Poland amounts to K K*. This FDI flow to Poland is 
beneficial for Germany as total income increases. Before FDI takes place, German 
income amounts to DBK 0D. After having invested K*K  in Poland, German income 
consists of the income DCK*0D earned at home plus the capital income CEK K* from 
the FDI in Poland. Hence, total income has increased by CEB.
4 Of course, this wel-
fare gain goes along with a redistribution of income from workers to capital owners. 
Assuming two factors (capital and labour) and constant returns to scale, labour in-
come in Germany can be measured by the area DBF in the initial situation. With the 
relocation of capital, labour income in Germany falls to DCG.  
It is important to point out that the welfare gains can only be realised if we allow this 
redistribution between factor incomes to happen. If wages cannot adjust to the new 
                                                 
4 Total welfare gains for Poland and Germany together amount to ABC.   10
conditions, the country as a whole will suffer unemployment and lose from EU en-
largement. The importance of labour market flexibility for the realisation of welfare 
gains is often neglected. We briefly illustrate the point – again using a simple dia-
grammatic approach. In Figure 8, we use the same model as before but show the 
marginal productivity of labour (instead of the marginal productivity of capital).
5 
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The horizontal axis measures the available labour force in Germany and Poland. La-
bour is immobile; the distribution of labour is given by L . With the initial distribution of 









L , respectively. Wages are paid according to the marginal product with full 
employment in both countries:  D w  and  PL w . Germany is the high-wage country.  
FDI leads to a relocation of capital from Germany to Poland, thus shifting the mar-
ginal product of labour curve in Germany downward and in Poland upward (point C). 
With flexible wages, the equilibrium would be reached with the wage rate  flex w i n  
both countries.  
If Germany seeks to remain a high-wage country and prevents wages from falling, 
even more capital will be relocated from Germany to Poland. The marginal productiv-




L ] and further upward 
                                                 
5 The basic result also holds in more complex settings such as a Hecker-Ohlin model with wage rigid-
ity; see Brecher (1974) and Davis (1998). We owe the idea to Seidel (2004) of discussing the impact 
of EU enlargement with rigid wages in a single-good, two-factor model.   11




L ]. In the long-run equilibrium, wages are equalized again, how-
ever at the high German wage rate. Poland has full employment at these wages 
(point A), whereas Germany suffers from unemployment. German employment is 




L w ) (K f = ], which remains below the la-
bour supply L . Germany defends the high wage rate at the cost of inefficient 
unemployment (AD). 
Downwardly rigid wages are a relevant scenario for Germany. As we have shown in 
Section 2, unemployment is predominantly skill specific and is caused by the welfare 
system that creates an implicit minimum wage. Due to the lower labour productivity in 
East Germany, this implicit minimum wage is binding for a larger share of workers 
there. If the (East) German economy cannot adjust its wages downwards for the low- 
and medium-skilled workers, the potential gains from EU enlargement cannot be real-
ised. German welfare may even decrease due to an increase in unemployment. This 
is not to say that EU enlargement was the wrong way to go. Our results merely stress 
the necessity of significant social policy reforms in Germany. 
4.  Are East German Firms Ready for Enlargement? 
Due to the geographic proximity of the accession countries, EU enlargement will 
have the strongest impact on Germany and Austria. The large wage differentials dis-
cussed in the previous section make it worthwhile for German firms to be prepared 
for the larger Europe. In particular, with the countries becoming members of the EU 
and thus taking over the acquis communautaire, it has become much easier and 
safer to carry out new investments in Eastern Europe or relocate existing production 
from Germany to the EU member states.  
And indeed, the new Eastern EU members have become attractive locations for for-
eign investors. A survey conducted by the Ifo Institute among more than 1,000 Ger-
man firms provides clear evidence. 44% of the polled firms have already committed 
themselves to an engagement in these countries; 19% carried out additional invest-
ments and 25% took advantage of the low labour costs and relocated plant sections 
to Eastern Europe (see Table 1). A considerable percentage of the firms is planning   12
further investment activities. Hence, the process of relocating business activities to 
the new EU member states will continue for some time in the future.
6 
Table 1: Investment Activities of German Firms in Eastern Europe 
Additional investments in Eastern Europe… 
    …carried out  19% 
    …planned  23% 
  
Relocation of plant sections to Eastern Europe… 
    …carried out  25% 
    …planned  12% 
  
At least one of these measures taken… 
 44% 
   Source: Handschuch (2004). 
Are these figures also representative for East German firms? Unfortunately, the an-
swer is no. East German firms are much more reluctant to adjust to the new eco-
nomic environment. A survey conducted by Ifo Dresden in 2003 among 1,500 Saxon 
companies showed that as much as 49% of the firms considered EU enlargement as 
important (Gerstenberger et al. 2004). Among those firms, the majority (62%) was 
still undecided at the time of the survey whether to take any measures or not (see 
Figure 9). 16% of those firms even declared that no measures were necessary to 
prepare themselves for the new market conditions. Only 22% had decided on any 
measures at all. This assessment is in sharp contrast to the firms’ expectations from 
EU enlargement. Four out of five firms fear the risk of tougher price competition. 
                                                 
6 Similar results for investment activities were found by Stadtmann, Hermann and Weigand (2003).   13
Figure 9: Are Saxon Firms Ready for EU-Enlargement? 














        Source: Gerstenberger et al. (2004). 
The main reason for the different attitudes among East and West German firms is the 
size distribution of firms. In Germany as a whole, only 13% of the firms have less 
than 20 employees, while 26% employ 100 or more (Federal Statistical Office Ger-
many 2003a). In contrast, most East German firms are small and medium sized and 
there are only very few large, internationally operating companies. Taking Saxony as 
representative for East Germany, 60% of the firms in mining and manufacturing have 
less than 20 employees, whereas only 9% employ 100 or more (Statistical Office of 
the Free State of Saxony 2003a). The bias in the size distribution can be seen as one 
factor for the East German firms’ concentration on the domestic market. Among the 
companies questioned in the Ifo survey, more than 90% transacted business within 
Germany, with special focus on the local market. The share of turnover realised in 
other countries barely reached 6% of total turnover. In the relatively close markets of 
Central and East Europe, Saxon companies realised only 1.1% of their total turnover 
in 2002. In total, East German firms in mining and manufacturing realised 25% of 
their turnover abroad, while it was 39% in West Germany (Federal Statistical Office 
Germany 2003a). 
5. Demographic  Change 
A third challenge – again of special relevance to the New Laender – is the demo-
graphic development. While the total population in Germany will remain almost con-  14
stant for the next 15 years,
7 Saxony will face a steep decline in its population (see 
Figure 10). In 2020, the Saxon population will have dropped to 85% of its 2000 level. 
Low fertility rates, an aging population and the ongoing East-West migration within 
Germany contribute to this decline. The development of the working age population is 
even more dramatic. Since the average age of the population is rising, the active 
population aged 15 to 65 will shrink by 25% from 2000 to 2020. This development is 
more or less the same in all of the New Laender.  
Figure 10: Demographic Development in Germany and Saxony 
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Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (2003b), Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony 
(2003b). 
Why should we care? A smaller population is not necessarily a bad thing – particu-
larly in a densely populated area such as Germany. Moreover, the out-migration of 
workers may be an efficient reaction to better employment conditions in other Ger-
man regions. For the New Laender, however, the development is threatening as it 
weakens their comparative advantage in knowledge-intensive production towards 
Eastern Europe. Given the inefficient rigidities in the German labour market (see Fig-
ure 4 and Section 3), demographic change will not eliminate unemployment among 
the low-skilled but may create a scarcity of the high-skilled – thus making the New 
Laender less attractive for firms’ location choices. 
                                                 
7 The population decline in Germany as a whole will start around 2013. The Federal Statistical Office 
expects a reduction of the German population from currently 82.5m to 75m in 2050 (Federal Statistical 
Office Germany 2003b).   15
Figure 11 reports the results from a recent Ifo study for Saxony (Thum et al. 2004). 
The employment gap measures the difference between the labour force (labour sup-
ply) and labour demand, according to the highest educational level achieved. The 
employment gap for the low-skilled (without vocational training) amounted to 105,114 
in 2002
8 and will decline only marginally; there will still be an excess supply of more 
than 60,000 workers in 2020. Hence, demographic change will not automatically 
eliminate unemployment as is often claimed by politicians. However, the situation is 
quite different for the high-skilled (university degree). The existing employment gap 
will shrink in the coming years making high-skilled workers a scarce resource in the 
Saxon labour market. Clearly, the employment gap will hardly become negative as 
Figure 11 suggests. The scarcity of high-skilled workers will force firms either to pay 
higher wages (to attract workers from outside or prevent them from leaving Saxony) 
or to relocate their business to regions with more abundant labour markets. 
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Source: Thum et al. (2004, Figure 4.4). 
6. Conclusion 
EU enlargement offers significant welfare gains to old and new member states. How-
ever, these welfare gains do not come automatically but have to be earned by appro-
priate adjustments in domestic policies. This is particularly relevant for Germany’s 
                                                 
8 This number translates into an unemployment rate of roughly 50%; see Figure 4.   16
New Laender, which could benefit from the proximity to the new EU member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe but which also suffer particularly from inefficient institu-
tions in Germany.  
It is mainly the labour market that prevents the realisation of gains from trade. Wel-
fare gains will only be realised if wage adjustment is flexible. Instead, the German 
welfare system implicitly creates downward rigid wages. Without appropriate social 
policy reforms, the competitive pressure and the mobility of capital will destroy jobs in 
the New Laender. Instead of realising welfare gains, East Germany may simply ex-
perience rising unemployment – in particular of low- and medium-skilled workers. In 
that case, it is not EU enlargement that should be blamed but inefficient domestic 
institutions. 
We also pointed out two further challenges for domestic policies in the wake of EU 
enlargement. First, the dominance of small and medium sized firms in the New 
Laender makes the necessary adjustments more difficult. And second, demographic 
change poses a challenge for the New Laender as it threatens their position in high-
skilled production. 
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